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DDAS Accident Report
Accident details
Report date: 05/03/2011

Accident number: 623

Accident time: 16:50

Accident Date: 06/07/2009

Where it occurred: MF E 360, Al Akaider
Village, Almafraq
Province

Country: Jordan

Primary cause: Victim inattention (?)

Secondary cause: Unavoidable (?)

Class: Excavation accident

Date of main report: Not recorded

ID original source: None

Name of source: Demining group

Organisation: [Name removed]
Mine/device: M14 AP blast

Ground condition: grass/grazing area
hard
rocks/stones
Date last modified: 05/03/2011

Date record created:
No of victims: 1

No of documents: 2

Map details
Longitude:

Latitude:

Alt. coord. system:

Coordinates fixed by:

Map east: 36.076490 E

Map north: 32.531190 N

Map scale:

Map series:

Map edition:

Map sheet:

Map name:

Accident Notes
no independent investigation available (?)
standing to excavate (?)
use of rake (?)
Inadequate detector pinpointing
non injurious accident (?)

Accident report
An internal demining group accident report was made available. The conversion into a DDAS
file has led to some of the original formatting being lost. Text in square brackets [ ] is
editorial.
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The internal report is reproduced below, edited for anonymity.

INCIDIENT INVESTIGATION [Demining group] – MINE ACTION TEAM - JORDAN
GRID REF: 32.531190 N: 36.076490 E
MINEFIELD NO – 360, MINEFIELD TASK ID - E 360 AL AKAIDER 4
INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED BY – [Demining group], [Name removed].
DEMINER: [the Victim]. NIC NO (ID NUMBER): [Removed]
SECTION COMMANDER: [Name removed]. TEAM LEADER: [Name removed]. TEAM
METAL DETECTOR 5.

:

TIME OF INCIDENT: 04:50 PM, DATE OF INCIDENT: 6 JULY 2009
NATURE OF INJURY: No Injury.
TYPE OF MINE: Anti Personnel M 14

IMSMA DETAILED REPORT FOR MINE INCIDENT Monday, 6 July 2009
Part 1 – Description of the incident
1. Organisation name: [Demining group], JORDAN Team No: Metal Detector 5.
2. Incident date:06/07/2009. Time: 04:50 PM
3. Location of incident: NORTH EAST SECTOR, Province: ALMAFRAQ, Village: AL
AKAIDER. Project or task No: E 360 AL-AKAIDER 4
4. Name of site manager or team leader: [Name removed].
5. Type of incident: M14 AP MINE, uncontrolled detonation of a mine.
6. Device was detonated by: deminer
7. Device detonated while: Raking with Heavy Rake
8. Device was found in an area classified as: a known hazardous area
9: Narrative (Describe how the incident happened. Attach additional pages and photographs
or diagrams to assist in clarifying the circumstances surrounding the incident):
While the deminer was trying to investigate a signal indicated by the metal detector and after
the usage of the light RAKE and when she started with the heavy RAKE, the deminer hit the
mine from the top on the pressure plate which initiated the mine.
Part 2 – Injuries
10. Did the incident result in any injuries? No
11. List people injured and nature of injury: [None]
Part 3 – Equipment damages
12. Did the incident result in any damage to equipment or property? No
13. List any mine action equipment or property damage: [None]
14. List damage to equipment or property owned by a member of the public or the
government. Include contact details of the owner or responsible person. [None]
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Part 4 – Explosive hazard
15. Provide details of mines/UXO/ other devices that were involved in the incident.
Device Type:

Method:

Determined by:

AP (Blast) Mine

Buried

RAKING

16. State specific device (if known): M 14 AP MINE
17. Comments (include measurements of any crater resulting from the explosion): Crater
Depth: approx. 15 cm / Width: approx. 40 cm
Part 5 - Site conditions
Describe the conditions at the site at time of the incident
Ground/Terrain: Hard, flat
Weather: Clear, Hot
Vegetation: Bush, Medium
Part 6 – Team and task details
20. Qualifications of Member(s) involved in the incident:
Name

Position in Location

Occupation

[The Victim]

Deminer

Metal Detector 5

21. How long had this team been?
a. At this site? 2 months
b. working on this task? 2 months
c. working on the day? 4:50 hours
22. Detector type: N/A Tripwire feeler used? No
23. Hand tool: HEAVY RAKE
24. PPE: Vest, Visor, [Blast boots]
25. Comments: [None]
Part 7 - Medical & First Aid
Medical treatment required? Yes [sic]
26. Medical Support at Incident Site: Medic, 1st Aid Kit, Stretcher, Ambulance, Safety Vehicle,
Radio to call forward medic.
27. Was a Mine Incident Drill carried out? Yes No
28. Time and distance data
a. Time from incident to SECTION MEDICAL POINT (03) minutes
b. Time spent at site administering treatment: nil minutes
c. Time from evacuation FROM to arrival King Abdullah Hospital: nil minutes
Part 8 – Reporting procedures
Reported by: [Name removed], [Demining group] Amman Office to: [Demining group] Offices
& NCDR
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Investigation conducted by: [Name removed], [Name removed]
Report compiled/translated by: [Name removed], [Name removed]
Verified by: [Name removed]

Observations and Recommendations
the incident caused by individual mistake while the deminer using the heavy RAKE in a
hacking motion not as the proper procedure the Raking motion, and most of the mines in the
area are surfaces mines that they can be recovered just with the usage of the light RAKE
even if that will cost the deminer more sweat but it will still safer.
The usage of the light RAKE will be enforced in the area.
Signed: Operations Coordinator: 6 JULY 2009

Attachments:
Statements by Injured Members
Statements by Witnesses
Photographs of Incident Site
Copy of Incident Report

Victim Report
Victim number: 806

Name: [Name removed]
Gender: Female

Age:
Status: deminer

Fit for work: yes

Compensation: N/A

Time to hospital: N/A

Protection issued: Frontal apron

Protection used: Frontal apron, Mask
visor, blast boots

Mask Visor
blast boots

Summary of injuries:
COMMENT: No injuries recorded.
No Medical report was made available.

Statements
Statement 1: the Victim
I started working in the third run at lane 6 and I removed 3 AP mines and then progressed in
my work and removed one AP mine from the front row from the enemy side, at that time
around 15:30 pm the team leader and sector coordinator came to my site to check on my
work, they told me that am working on the IOE C from lane 6, I entered in the fourth run to my
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site and I was looking for a signal inside the mines box but the signal was deep, so I used the
light rake at the beginning, after that I used the heavy rake when a blast happened to the
center mine.
Answers to Investigator Questions:
Yes, we took the safety brief before starting to work.
Yes, I was convinced according to what I was trained on that the signal in front of me is for an
AP mine.
Yes, I used the light rake at the beginning.
Yes, the area I’m working on is hard and stony.
No, I didn’t progress in work the right way to the right depth.

Statement 2: Team Leader
I gave my team the safety brief then I distributed them all to their sites I made QC for the
injured deminer, she has 3 AP mines removed from the interior row then she progressed to
the front to reach an angle in her way then in the fourth run the same day she got a signal for
a 9 o’clock AP mine from the external row so I was confused and asked the sector
coordinator who was available at the site to come and see the case cause we didn’t reach the
front angle, he came and we found out that she was working on the IOE C from the same
lane, the same day at 16:50 pm while the deminer was looking for the center mine and
working around the target the blast happened and I informed everybody about the accident.
Answers to Investigator Questions:
Yes, I informed the team that when they see a signal of a mine they should let me know about
it.
Yes, I assured everybody to use the light rake at the beginning.
Yes, I informed the team to follow all the instructions in their progress in work.

Statement 3: Section Commander
In the 3rd run I checked on the deminer and explained to her how she should work, she was
heading to a cluster of mines she removed 3 of them from the interior row, then a signal
shown to her on her way it was a 9 o’clock AP mine from the external row, then I asked the
team leader to show us where she is working cause there were a short angle in front of her
which is far from the mines box, he came with the sector coordinator and they told us she was
working on IOE C from this mine field, around 16:50 pm from the fourth run the deminer was
progressing to reach the signal place she was working on the right of the mine she removed
and there where the center mine, a blast happened and I informed about the accident.
Answers to Investigator Questions:
Yes, I explained to every deminer the nature of her work.
Yes, I assured everyone to use the light rake at the beginning.
Yes, I trained them on the right way how to progress in their work.
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Analysis
The primary cause of this accident is listed as Victim Inattention because the Victim
recognised that she had not been using the rakes in the correct way when the accident
occurred. The secondary cause is listed as Unavoidable because there is always a risk of
initiating a mine with the heavy rake so it is possible that the accident could not have been
avoided with the procedure. When searching for small mines, there is compelling evidence
that the procedure can be safe even when a mine is initiated (because of the distance from
the blast and the correct use of PPE).
The demining group who made this report available is thanked for its transparency and its
professional concern to share lessons that can be learned from accidents. This record, along
with several other records where rakes were used, provide compelling evidence that the
controlled use of rakes can be both effective and tolerably safe (reducing risk of severe injury
to tolerable levels).
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